After the electoral commission voted to give all twenty disputed electoral votes to Hayes, the House still had to vote for the count to become conclusive under the Constitution. Democrats, still angered and surprised by the outcome, filibustered the vote, leading to concerns of what might happen if the filibuster remained until Inauguration Day. In order to end the filibuster and certify Hayes' win, Republicans needed some Democrats to vote with them. The common perception is that the Compromise of 1877 was what ended the filibuster.
Common Thesis Regarding the Compromise of 1877:
Historian Allan Peskin explains the common thesis on the Compromise of 1877: “The South settled the issue by trading the Presidency for: (1) final withdrawal of Federal troops from the three disputed states; (2) a promise of financial aid in the construction of the Texas and Pacific Railroad; (3) the appointment of a Southerner as Postmaster General; (4) the assurance of Federal subsidies to aid Southern rehabilitation; and (5) a tacit admission that the South alone should resolve its racial problem. In addition, some southerners promised to help the Republicans organize the next House of Representatives” [1].
Popular Narrative:
“The Compromise of 1877 …
resolved the 1876 election”[2]. “The Compromise of 1877 was an off-the-record deal, struck between Republicans and Democrats, that determined the victor of the 1876 presidential election. It also marks the official end of the Reconstruction Era — the 12-year period after the Civil War, designed to help reunify the country after the crisis of secession”[3].
"The Compromise of 1877 gave Rutherford B. Hayes the presidency in exchange for the end of Reconstruction in the South"[4].
"The Democrats gave up their claim to the presidency in return for promises from the Republicans to withdraw the remaining federal troops from the former Confederate states, to end Northern interference in local Southern politics, to share Southern patronage with Democrats, and to appoint at least one Southern Democrat to the cabinet. Perhaps the most important concession of all was the Republicans’ vow to support congressional appropriations for much-needed railroad construction and other internal improvements to help the war-struck Southern economy"[5].
“[Reconstruction] ended BOOM like it had been struck by lightning and it ended because of a lost presidential election... You can have the presidency which you did not win in this election but in exchange the Confederacy gets the South back. And that’s how Reconstruction was switched off in the South like somebody taking an axe to a junction box… Reconstruction got traded for the White House.”
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Scholarly Rebuttals:
Allan Peskin:
“None of the elements of the alleged bargain of 1877 can explain the outcome of the election crisis[7]... Patronage was not enough - unity of economic interests was not enough - to overcome the bitter legacy of the Civil War and its aftermath[8]... The compromise negotiations may have significance insofar as they illuminate the internal dynamics of both southern politics and the Republican party, but in the immediate context of the Hayes- Tilden dispute their impact was less than decisive [9]... A deal whose major terms are never carried out appears suspiciously like no deal at all" [10]. Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer:
Republicans simply “outwitted and honeyfugled” the Democrats [11]. Speaker Randall (D-PA) “resolutely discountenanced the filibustering of some of his colleagues… he was supported by the sounder minds of his own party [12]. Michael Les Benedict:
"Democrats were in no better position to fight after the Electoral Commission decision than they were before the [commission] had been framed [14]... It is apparent that southerners made no disproportionate contribution to ending the filibuster [15]... Voting patterns” illustrate that “whatever motivated Democrats to support or oppose the filibuster movement, it affected all of them - northern or southern - pretty much the same way. The simple fact was that most of them realized that the battle was lost and were determined not to make matters worse [16]... It was not [the Compromise of 1877] - and still less any deals involving patronage, the Texas and Pacific Railroad, or the Mississippi levees-that broke the filibuster and guaranteed Hayes's inauguration” [17].
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Many historians point to Democrats breaking the filibuster as evidence that the compromise worked. However, it was northern Democrats who managed to break the filibuster despite standing to gain far less than their southern counterparts [18]. In fact, Tilden himself urged Democrats to break the filibuster, as “he did not want the blame for the chaos that inevitably would result from a filibuster” [19]. He asked Abram Hewitt and Speaker of the House Samuel J. Randall (D-PA), both northern Democrats, to put an end to it and they did. Many southern Democrats felt betrayed by their own party. Tilden seemed to understand something that many do not appreciate today. Would it really be prudent for the Democrats, who were still widely distrusted and excluded from politics, to try to grab back power under such contested circumstances as the election of 1876?[20]
What did come about from the so-called compromise?
If we accept the five supposed conditions of the compromise, what did come to fruition was only withdrawal of federal troops from the south and the appointment of Senator David M. Key (D-TN) as Postmaster General. Reconstruction was already coming to an end and growing increasingly unpopular when Hayes assumed the presidency (see more in "Reconstruction" section). Additionally, it was apparent throughout the campaign, and made clear in Hayes’ nomination speech, that he intended to end Reconstruction. Hayes' decision to withdraw the remaining federal troops from South Carolina and Louisiana was “praised by many newspapers and politicians in both the North and South” at the time [21]. Both the withdrawal of troops and the appointment of Key were seen by Hayes as an opportunity to forge an alliance with southern conservatives, like old Whigs. Amidst the disputed election, Hayes and James Garfield discussed the potential of realignment in the context of the Key appointment. Hayes explained he wanted party affiliation to depend "on the great commercial and industrial questions rather than on questions of race and color"[22]. These two outcomes were hardly surprising and are not necessarily attributable to the compromise, as Hayes had his own reasons for the actions.
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What did not come about from the so-called compromise?
Historian Don Fehrenbacher described the compromise as “primarily an economic arrangement reflecting the ambitions of railroad promoters”[24]. Encyclopedia Britannica describes the compromise, saying, "Perhaps the most important concession of all was the Republicans’ vow to support congressional appropriations for much-needed railroad construction" Why, then, was no subsidy ever granted to the Texas & Pacific Railroad, which would have connected the south to the Pacific coast for the first time. The railroad was never even built. It is possible that Hayes failed to follow through on his end of the bargain, but there was no public record or evidence of Hayes ever endorsing the railroad [25]. It is more convincing that this had no influence over the electoral outcome.
Historians argue that Hayes and the Republicans had been assured that nine southern congressman would bolt the Democratic caucus and elect House minority leader, Rep. James Garfield (R-OH) over Randall (D-PA) to be the new speaker. When the time came, however, every Democrat toed the party line and voted for Speaker Randall [26].
Historians argue that Hayes and the Republicans had been assured that nine southern congressman would bolt the Democratic caucus and elect House minority leader, Rep. James Garfield (R-OH) over Randall (D-PA) to be the new speaker. When the time came, however, every Democrat toed the party line and voted for Speaker Randall [26].
Compromise?
Though many attribute Hayes’ victory to the Compromise of 1877, its impact is given far too much weight. The “compromise,” if it even existed, did not give victory to Hayes over Tilden, as that decision was already preordained. While it is clear that Republicans and Democrats did meet in an attempt to end the filibuster and that policy discussions such as Hayes’ desire for southern home rule were discussed, it is not clear that there was a master compromise. After all, few of the supposed conditions were carried out, implying no quid pro quo or sense of obligation. Arguably what did occur would have happened anyway. The process of granting home rule to the South had already begun under Grant and had been a clear aspiration of Hayes during the campaign. By appointing southerners to his new administration, Hayes intended to bridge a divide. Hayes pursued both measures to forge alliances and heal sectional tensions at a time when a second Civil War seemed entirely possible. While this approach propelled Hayes to victory in the most protracted electoral process yet experienced by the country, it ironically failed in achieving sectional reconciliation during his presidency.
[1] Allan Peskin, “Was There a Compromise of 1877?” The Journal of American History, 60:1 (June 1973). 64. [JSTOR]
[2] Olivia B. Waxman, “Not Every U.S. Presidential Race Has Been Decided on Election Day. Here’s What to Know About America’s History of Contested Elections,” Time, November 4, 2020, https://time.com/5903361/contested-election-history/.
[3] Katherine Mines, “The Compromise of 1877: A Political Bargain Seals the Election of 1876,” History Cooperative, May 3, 2020, https://historycooperative.org/compromise-of-1877/#:~:text=The%20Compromise%20of%201877%20was%20an%20off-the-record%20deal%2C,reunify%20the%20country%20after%20the%20crisis%20of%20secession.
[4] “The Compromise of 1877,” Khan Academy, https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-history/civil-war-era/reconstruction/a/compromise-of-1877.
[5] “Wormley Conference,” Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/Wormley-Conference.
[6] "Life Portrait of James Garfield," C-SPAN, July 26, 1999, https://www.c-span.org/video/?151093-1/life-portrait-james-garfield.
[7] Allan Peskin, “Was There a Compromise of 1877?,” 72.
[8] Ibid, 71.
[9] Ibid, 74.
[10] Ibid, 65
[11] Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer, “A History of the United States Since the Civil War,” Volume III, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1926), 307 [Internet Archive]
[12] Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer, “A History of the United States Since the Civil War,” 309.
[13] "Teacher Workshops to Focus on Texas and U.S. History," Humanities Texas, January 2011, https://www.humanitiestexas.org/news/articles/teacher-workshops-focus-texas-and-us-history.
[14] Michael Les Benedict, “Southern Democrats in the Crisis of 1876-1877: A Reconsideration of Reunion and Reaction,” The Journal of Southern History, 46:4 (Nov., 1980) 513. [JSTOR]
[15] Ibid, 517.
[16] Ibid, 518.
[17] Ibid, 520.
[18] Allan Peskin, “Was There a Compromise of 1877?” The Journal of American History, 60:1 (June 1973). 66. [JSTOR]
[19] Walker Lewis, “The Hayes-Tilden Election Contest (Part II),” American Bar Association Journal, 47:2 (February 1961), p. 165. [JSTOR]
[20] Allan Peskin, “Was There a Compromise of 1877?,” 72.
[21] Thomas J. Culbertson, “Did Rutherford B. Hayes End Reconstruction?,” Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Center, February 17, 2013. [LECTURE]
[22] Allan Peskin, “Was There a Compromise of 1877?,” 71.
[23] “David M. Key,” Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/biography/David-M-Key.
[24] Don Fehrenbacher, “Disunion and Reunion,” John Hingham, ed. The Reconstruction of American History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), 115. [INTERNET ARCHIVE]
[25] Allan Peskin, “Was There a Compromise of 1877?,” 78.
[26] Ibid, 71.
[27] George C. Werner. “Texas and Pacific Railroad,” Texas State Historical Association, https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/texas-and-pacific-railway#:~:text=The%20Texas%20and%20Pacific%20Railway%20Company%20was%20the,and%20Pacific%20Railway%20Company%20on%20May%202%2C%201872.